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Introduction
With the increasing diffusion of modern information and communication technologies, network markets have become an omnipresent phenomenon.
Innovations such as email, online auctions, and file sharing exhibit network externalities and play an important role in today's economy. The economics literature offers a well-founded theory of network goods. Examples in-
clude Besen/Farrel (1994) , David (1985) , Farrel/Saloner (1986) , Katz/Shapiro (1985; 1986; and Liebowitz/Margolis (1994) . In this paper, we refer to this theory of network goods and relate it to studies about peer influence, a concept from the field of sociology or social psychology (see, e.g., Cialdini/Trust 1998).
In network markets, the utility that a consumer derives from consumption of the good increases along with the number of other individuals consuming the good (Katz/Shapiro 1985), a phenomenon commonly referred to as network externalities. In this paper, we establish and empirically test a theory that disentangles the two mechanisms by which these network externalities drive the diffusion of an innovative network good. The first mechanism builds on the individual's own insight that his/her benefit increases with a larger number of installed units. An individual would adopt an innovative network good if the number of installed units were large enough to create a substantial benefit. Those individuals already in the network matter only insofar as they increase the number of installed units. We name this mechanism installed-base-effect. The second mechanism works such that those who have already adopted the network good have an incentive to persuade others to also adopt the network good, because their own utility depends strongly on their peers being in the network. With this mechanism, the individual's own insight that a large network creates substantial benefits is of less importance. The individual adopts the network good, because peers exert influence on the adoption decision. We label this mechanism peer-effect.
A clear separation of these two mechanisms helps us to better understand how an innovative network good is diffused. It also has practical value for marketing managers, for whom network externalities may play an important role. If, for example, network externalities are present in a market dominated by a large incumbent, a potential entrant into this market must take this fact into account. Absent an installed base, a potential customer faces substantial disadvantages with the entrant's product compared to the incumbent's. The entrant is obliged to offer compensation. For example, the entrant might offer a price discount to early adopters of the new standard or make her products available on a rental basis (Liebowitz/Margolis 1990). Another strategy is to achieve compatibility with the incumbent's product (Besen/Farrel 1994) .
In this paper we argue for a different approach. As we demonstrate, peer influence constitutes an important factor influencing the decision whether to adopt a network good. Therefore, a successful market entry strategy might be to count on peer influence to stimulate the diffusion of a new network product. For example, the entrant might advertise the product in a way that favors peer influence (e.g., Pechmann/Knight 2002) or might offer a bonus for those customers who successfully attract new customers.
Our research design is as follows. We developed a questionnaire that measured the level of peer influence and the impact of the installed base with regard to the adoption of an innovative network product and conducted a survey (N = 470). The aim of the survey was to measure the impact of the peer-or the installed-base-effect on the adoption and diffusion of an innovative network good, Instant Messaging (IM). We analyzed the data using hazard rate models.
Our study extends the literature in various aspects.
(1) We develop a conceptual framework to investigate how network externalities and peer influence interact with each other. In particular, we provide a rationale to explain why individuals might influence their peers to adopt a particular network good. (2) We develop new scales to measure the impact of the installed base as well as the degree of peer influence. (3) For the adoption and diffusion of Instant Messaging our empirical evidence shows that peer influence has a stronger impact than does the more familiar installed-baseeffect. For Online Banking, a comparable innovation without network externalities, this peer-effect seems to play no role. (4) We discuss the marketing implications of our findings and suggest a set of possible market entry strategies into network markets.
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 briefly reviews the literature about network externalities and peer influence, and relates it to our research question. Section 3 describes Instant Messaging, the innovation covered in the survey. Section 4 lays out our hypotheses. Section 5 describes the data set and the methods used in the empirical study. Section 6 reports the results. Section 7 discusses our results as well as the study's limitations and provides some ideas for further research. Section 8 points out marketing implications.
Theoretical Framework and Existing Literature

Network Externalities
The first articles in the field of network economics were inspired by the U.S. federal antitrust agency's controversial decision to break up AT&T, by then the largest company in the world. Katz/Shapiro (1985) took up this case and developed a theory about the interrelation between network products and market competition. They differentiated between direct and indirect network externalities. If the number of users of a particular product has a direct influence on the value of the product, then direct network external-ities are present (e.g., in the case of the fax or the telephone). In contrast, if the quality of the product is influenced by the diffusion of another product, then indirect network externalities prevail (e.g., the relation between computer hardware and computer software Shankar/Bayus 1997). Our study differs, in that it represents an attempt to measure the effects of network externalities on the micro-level. However, our aim is not to measure the degree of direct network externalities in itself, but to focus on its impact on technology adoption in the form of the two mechanisms introduced above, the installed-base-or the peer-effect.
Peer Influence
The concept of peer influence focuses on the relationship between the adopter and his/her social environment. When individuals are together in groups, they exercise influence on each other (Cialdini/Trust 1998) . There are two competing perspectives on how peer influence affects an individual's behavior. An individual might agree with another individual's opinion because he or she was persuaded by the arguments (informational influence) or because he or she concedes to some kind of social pressure (normative influence) (Cialdini/Trust 1998) . Peer influence as a concept is discussed in a variety of disciplines including sociology, psychology, and consumer behaviour research. Yet, to the best of our knowledge, the concept has not been applied to the adoption of network goods. Our purpose is to find out about the influence that peers might exert on an individual that has not yet adopted a particular network good, Instant Messaging.
On a conceptual basis, peer influence is related to and partially overlaps with peer pressure, word-of-mouth effects, and social contagion. Unfortunately, these concepts are not used in a consistent way in either the literature or across different disciplines. Therefore, some further clarifications and explanations appear necessary to describe what exactly we aim to measure in our study.
Peer pressure: Peers might persuade an individual to behave in a way in which he originally did not intend to (e.g., the individual starts to smoke which he would otherwise not have started). This behavior is referred to as peer pressure and can be broken down into a "good" and a "bad" type.
With "bad" peer pressure, the individual is coerced to act against her own will, but with "good" peer pressure she is pushed into something she either did not have the courage to do or simply had not thought about. The distinction draws on the following: with "good" peer pressure, the individual perceives her action -at least from an ex-post perspective -as a good thing to do, while with "bad" peer pressure this is not the case. However, we note that the meaning of peer pressure differs substantially, according to the discipline concerned: in sociology, the term is mainly used in its negative connotation. Some sociological studies analyse the impact of peer pressure on smoking, drug, and alcohol use (e.g., Halebsky 1987; Melby et al. 1993) .
In some economics studies, peer pressure is regarded as a way to overcome the free-rider problem associated with teams (e.g., Falk/Ichino 2006; Kan-del/Lazear 1992). Peer pressure serves here as a motivational device, deterring the individual to shirk on her fellow team members, which is, at least from a welfare perspective, something positive.
For our study, we do not know about the original motivation of the potential adopter. In particular, we do not know whether she originally wanted to adopt the network good or not, and whether or not she later found that the adoption decision was beneficial. Since our primary interest is in understanding the drivers of the adoption decision rather than the consequences for each individual, we speak of peer influence rather than peer pressure, because peer influence has a less judgmental connotation.
Word-of-mouth:
The effect of peer influence must be separated from word- nations -normative pressures and network effects -directly relate to the content of our study. Normative pressures concern the peer effect, and network effects concern the installed-base-effect. In a nutshell, the concept of social contagion offers many more causal mechanisms than just peer influence and network externalities, the two concepts we analyze.
In our study, we want to find out whether a not-yet-adopter of a particular network good is drawn into the network by his peers and how this effect compares to the installed-base-effect. We do not investigate whether the peers exert their influence by means of word-of-mouth or whether the notyet-adopters perceive this influence as "good" or "bad."
Because we discuss the marketing implications of our findings (see section 8), below, we sketch some particular pieces of research from the consumer behavior literature. In this literature, peer influence is mentioned in several ways. Bearden/Etzel (1982) categorize goods along two dimensions: first, according to whether they are commodities or luxury goods, and second, according to whether they are consumed in public or in private. (1982) show that the strongest degree of peer influence takes place in the category of luxury good/consumption in public, and the weak-est degree of peer influence occurs in the category of commodity/consumption in private. In a replication and extension of Bearden/Etzel's (1982 ) study, Childers/Rao (1992 show that the influence of various reference groups varies with product type. A familial reference group has a greater impact on the consumption decision of privately consumed goods, and a peer-based reference group mainly influences con- (1)
Bearden/Etzel
The consumer's utility increases along with the size of the network (N).
Thus, as long as her marginal benefit of having a larger network exceeds her marginal cost of persuading a friend to join, then each consumer in the network has a strong incentive to persuade another person to join the network. We assume the consumer's marginal benefit from a new network member to decrease in N, i.e., The source and the intensity of peer influence should change along with the diffusion of the network good. In the beginning, when only few people are in the network, the benefit from attracting new network members should be greater than at a later stage. Thus, we should observe intensive peer influence exerted by a small number of people. At a later stage, the situation should be different. The marginal benefit of attracting new network members is small, leading to a lower level of peer influence than at the earlier stage. On the other hand, the network community is larger than at the beginning, and more network members might exert influence.
As denoted in equation (1) Figure 1 conceptualizes the mechanisms described above.
Insert figure 1 about here.
Given this conceptual framework, we derive two hypotheses related to our survey.
Following our general statement on the interrelation between network externalities and peer influence, and the resulting peer-effect, peer influence should be crucial to the adoption of a network good. Therefore, if the participants perceive Instant Messaging as a network good, hypothesis 1 should hold.
Hypothesis 1: The propensity to adopt Instant Messaging increases with a higher level of peer influence (peer-effect).
For the installed-base-effect of network externalities and the adoption or diffusion of Instant Messaging, we formulate hypothesis 2:
Hypothesis 2: The propensity to adopt Instant Messaging increases with a higher level of perceived direct network exter-
nalities (installed-base-effect).
We do not explicitly formulate the question of whether the one or the other effect dominates as a hypothesis, but it is nevertheless of great interest, since it has important implications on marketing strategy.
Empirical Study
Data
To test our hypotheses, we conducted an online survey with altogether 470
participants. Our questionnaire was of a retrospective type, meaning that the participants were asked to answer the questions from the perspective of the moment when they decided about whether or not to adopt Instant Messaging. In particular, the participants were asked whether they adopted the innovation and, if applicable, in which year they did so. Those who did not know about the innovation concerned were directed to the questions concerning the background of the individual. The constructs were operationalized by means of single-and multi-item measures, where we used a 6-point Likert scale ranging from "strongly disagree" (1) to "strongly agree" (6). To find out whether the participant perceived the size of the installed base (i.e., the number of individuals who have already adopted) as important, she was asked to answer the following statement:
Insert As control variables, we included questions about the following constructs:
• 2 In addition, we included an item related to word-of-mouth communication into the questionnaire and found it to be strongly correlated with the item related to peer influence (r = 0.69). This is consistent with the view that peer influence is most likely to occur due to word-of-mouth communication. In order to separate word-of-mouth effects from peer influence, we excluded the word-of-mouth construct from the regression. However, the results reported below do not qualitatively change if word-of-mouth effects are included in the peer-effects construct. 3 To control for indirect network effects, we asked the participant to name which other Internet-applications she uses (online auctions, file sharing, etc.).
In several aspects our questionnaire resembles the questionnaire of Litfin (2000), who studied the adoption and diffusion on an innovative telecommunication service. Our questionnaire (in German) is available from the corresponding author.
Method
To study the individual duration until the adoption, we estimate a hazard rate model. Because our survey measures duration until adoption in discrete time intervals (years), we specify a discrete time model. In addition, given that diffusion processes can best be described by a logistic function (Griliches 1957; Stoneman 2002), we assume that the cumulative distribution of all adoption decisions over time is logistic. We specify duration dependence as flexible piecewise constants (DURAT1-DURAT10). Doing so implies that we do not need to assume that all individuals will adopt the innovation as time approaches infinity. To estimate the model, we follow Jenkins (1995) and take advantage of the close relation between generalized linear models and discrete time hazard rate models. Technically, we perform the estimation with STATA's xtlogit command, which we apply to the survey data reorganized in person-period format. 4 We are interested in the probability of the participant exiting the status of non-adopter at t, given that he did not adopt until t (hazard rate). We specify the discrete time hazard rate function as
The data-file as well as the STATA ® log-file can be requested from the corresponding author.
where is the hazard rate in period v with higher degree of peer influence has a positive impact on the participant's hazard rate, i.e., her probability of exiting the status of non-adopter at t,
given that she did not adopt until t. This result is in line with other qualitative evidence. For example, Grinter/Palen (2002) find that Instant Messaging communications are "mostly restricted to one's 'real space friends' and that its adoption is best described as group wise".
6 Thus, the remaining unexplained variance is purely random and not due to omitted variables. 7 A two-sided t-test about the equality of means is rejected with p<0.001.
Hypothesis 2: Installed-base-effect of Network Externalities
The results of the hazard rate analysis do not support hypothesis 2. The ß-coefficient in the hazard rate model is statistically nonsignificant at -0.097 (table 3) . Hence, it seems that the expectations about the installed base (table 1) did not have a decisive influence on the adoption decision. This result is surprising, but it accords with the findings of Litfin (2000, 306) , who does not find an adoption stimulating influence of the size of the installed base on the diffusion of an innovative telecommunication service. It seems that the impact of network externalities on the diffusion of a network good is not as straightforward as some articles from the field of network theory suggest (e.g., Katz/Shapiro 1986; .
In a nutshell, the peer-effect clearly dominated the installed-base-effect.
The participants were pulled into the network by their friends, rather than adopting it just because of their own insight that a larger network would offer them a greater benefit. We tested our theory and our operationalization of the two effects by applying the same questionnaire to a comparable non-network product, Online Banking (see table A5 ). In this case, we could find no impact of peer influence, providing further evidence for our theory about the interrelation between network externalities and peer influence.
Impact of Control Variables
The inclusion of the control variables yields some interesting results: the perceived risk attached to the adoption of Instant Messaging seemed to play an important role. The ß-coefficient in the hazard rate model is -0.41 with p<0.001 (table 3). It seems that worries about being affected with a computer virus, problems of data protection, or distraction from other things caused individuals to adopt Instant Messaging at a later point in time. The original benefit of Instant Messaging (e.g., its speed) seemed to have no impact on the adoption decision, which supports the idea of Instant Mes-saging being a network good. Furthermore, the perceived degree of the effectiveness of the innovation's trialability, the participant's innovativeness, and the degree of indirect network externalities seemed to have an adoption-stimulating impact, but a higher age seemed to hinder adoption. We find that the degree of opinion leadership has no significant impact on the adoption decision.
Discussion, Limitations, and Further Research
We find empirical support for our theory claiming that peer influence constitutes an important factor in the adoption of an innovative network good, because the users of a network good have an incentive to convince others to purchase the same product, given that their utility depends on the number of other users. This peer influence turns out to have a stronger impact on adoption decisions than does the installed-base-effect, based on the individual's insight that a larger number of users increases her benefit. Also, we find that peer influence had no significant influence on the adoption decision of a comparable innovation without network effects. This finding suggests that in some cases, the degree of peer influence on the adoption decisions can be partially explained by network externalities.
Our paper contributes to the literature by providing a conceptualization about the interrelation between network externalities and peer influence, by developing and testing scales measuring the two constructs, and by providing a straightforward explanation of peer influence in network markets.
From the perspective of the practitioner, the findings have important implications for marketing strategy (see section 8).
Our empirical research design suffers from two limitations. First, we estimated our models with a pseudo-panel data set generated through a retrospective survey. Retrospective surveys depend crucially on the participant's memory, which might sometimes bias the results (Schnell et al. 2005, 233) . Second, the covariates are time-invariant. The reason is that pre-test interviews showed that the participants were not able to answer the questions in a time-variant manner. It would also be interesting to learn more about the impact of peer influence on adopting other network goods such as internet telephony or a membership in a sports club. From a model-theoretical perspective, it might be interesting to develop a model about the interrelation between peer influence and network externalities.
Marketing Implications
In the field of marketing strategy, there is a wide range of literature on firstmover advantages (see Kerin et al. 1992 for an extensive overview). From an industrial organization perspective, the first-mover advantage can be explained by the barriers-to-entry concept. Von Weizsäcker (1980, 400) describes a barrier to entry as a "cost of producing which must be borne by a firm which seeks to enter an industry but is not borne by firms already in the industry". In our particular example of a network market, the barrier to entry is less a cost of production, and more an additional cost of distribution. The incumbent or early mover has the benefit of a larger network size, resulting in peer influence in favor of her product. To enter the market successfully, the follower must find a way to reduce this peer influence. Possible strategies from the literature on network economics range from establishing compatibility with the incumbent's product (Besen/Farrel 1994) or offering a guarantee of satisfaction or a price discount (Liebowitz/Margolis 1994). A common factor in these strategies is that they all try to reduce the degree or the impact of the incumbent's installed-base-advantage.
However, since it is the peer-effect and not the installed-base-effect of network externalities that influences the adoption decision in our case, another approach might also produce good results. A good strategy might be to create favorable conditions that increase peer influence, thus stimulating the adoption of a product such as consumption in public, commercials embedding peers 8 or giving early adopters an incentive to attract new customers.
Another strategy might be to concentrate the efforts of market entry on so- Likelihood-ratio-test of rho = 0 is not rejected on a conventional level (p=0.471).
Note: Asterisks indicate that coefficient is significantly different form zero at the 10 percent ( † ), 5 percent (*), 1 percent (**), or 0.1 percent (***) level. 
Note:
We also asked about the adoption of online banking. As many of the respondents were not able to answer questions about Instant Messaging, the sample size is reduced from 470 to 370 participants. 
Notes:
1 We obtain the scale from a marketing scales handbook, edited by
Bruner/Hensel (1992, 292) . For this scale, Dickerson/Gentry (1983) report a Cronbach α of 0.6. 2 We include the construct in the multivariate analysis as an index variable (mean of corresponding single item measures). We report the Cronbach α to demonstrate the degree of the construct's internal consistency. 3 We construct the variable MALE as a yes/no-question. 4 Adopters received the questions in past tense. Non-adopters received the questions in present tense. 
